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Narrating Dignity: Islamophobia, Racial 
Profiling, and National Security Before 
the Supreme Court of Canada
REEM BAHDI*
Captain Javed Latif, a Muslim Canadian pilot from Pakistan, was denied pilot refresher 
training by Bombardier Aerospace Training Center in Canada based on information received 
from US national security officials. Almost 12 years after Captain Javed Latif’s ordeal began, 
the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed a decision by the Quebec Court of Appeal overturning a 
finding by a Quebec Human Rights Tribunal that Latif had been racially profiled. The Supreme 
Court of Canada’s decision ultimately exposes and perpetuates a deep unwillingness to 
challenge the stereotyping of Muslims as terrorists in Canada. In response, this commentary 
seeks to excavate Captain Latif’s fuller story largely through a reading of silences. It critically 
analyzes the Court’s claim that the Tribunal had little or no evidence before it to ground its 
finding of discrimination.
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Silence . . .
. . . is a presence
it has a history a form
Do not confuse it
with any kind of absence1
Law gives a vision depth of field, by placing one part of it in the highlight of 
insistent and immediate demand while casting another part in the shadow of the 
millennium.2
INACCURATE OR INCOMPLETE FACTS can become reified truths through the legal 
process. Sometimes a court is presented with erroneous facts that nonetheless 
evolve into conventional wisdom once adopted into the court’s reasons.3 At other 
times, a court’s own characterization can fracture the facts.4 Either way, the 
judicial rendition becomes the dominant narrative read in law schools, cited by 
judges and other decision-makers, and analyzed by legal experts.
Given the construction and reconstruction of relevant facts and narratives 
throughout the naming, blaming, and claiming process,5 legal scholars of various 
methodological and political persuasions sometimes turn to “reading silences” 
to understand law and legal architecture. For their part, feminists and critical 
race scholars have long stressed the importance of reading “silence as language”6 
because the unsaid can reveal as much about legal values, priorities, imaginations 
and possibilities as the stated word. Individual stories of marginalization can 
1.  Adrienne Rich, “The Cartographies of Silence” in Adrienne Rich, ed, The Dream of a 
Common Language: Poems 1974–1977 (New York: WW Norton, 1978) 16 at 17.
2. Robert Cover, “Nomos and Narrative” in Martha Minow, Michael Ryan & Austin Sarat, 
eds, Narrative, Violence, and the Law: The Essays of Robert Cover (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1993) 95 at 102.
3. See Eric M Adams, “Errors of Fact and Law: Race, Space and Hockey in Christie v York” 
(2012) 62:4 UTLJ 463.
4. See John T Noonan, Persons and the Masks of Law (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 1976).
5. Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz, eds, Law’s Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
6. Nthabiseng Motsemme, “The Mute Always Speak: On Women’s Silences at the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission” (2004) 52:5 Current Sociology 909. Motsemme locates ways 
of reading these silences present in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission testimonies 
through a discussion of the following themes: silence as resistance and courage, silence as 
illusion of stability, and silence as a site for coping and the reconstitution of self.
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often be found in the unsaid.7 Individual stories, when recovered from obscurity 
and brought together with similar experiences—much as an archive or museum 
brings together memories or excavated artifacts—can help us further understand 
both the law’s role in affirming or rejecting racialized policies and practices as well 
as its role in national self-identification.
This commentary analyzes the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Quebec 
(Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Bombardier 
Inc (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center).8 Almost twelve years after Captain 
Javed Latif ’s ordeal began, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed a decision 
by the Quebec Court of Appeal overturning a finding by a Quebec Human 
Rights Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) that Bombardier had discriminated against 
him. While one can find some cause for celebration in the Court’s reasons,9 the 
decision ultimately exposes and perpetuates a deep unwillingness to challenge the 
stereotyping of Muslims as terrorists in Canada. In response, this commentary 
seeks to excavate Latif ’s fuller story largely through a reading of silences. The 
Quebec Human Rights Tribunal advanced two discrete but intersecting theories 
in its finding of discrimination by Bombardier against Latif. The Court, however, 
7. Various authors discuss and demonstrate the importance of narrative to law. For some of 
the classics, see bell hooks, “Theory as Liberatory Practice” (1991) 4:1 Yale JL & Feminism 
1; Patricia J Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of A Law Professor (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991); Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color” (1991) 43:6 
Stan L Rev 1241; Richard Delgado, “Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for 
Narrative” (1989) 87:8 Mich L Rev 2411; Brooks & Gewirtz, supra note 5; Cover, supra 
note 2; Maya Angelou, I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings (New York: Random House, 1969). 
Angelou’s work does not speak to law directly but nonetheless offers a powerful example of 
narrative that reveals the impact of law. Constance Backhouse offers the best and broadest 
example of narrative style in the Canadian context. See for example Constance Backhouse, 
Colour Coded: A Legal History of Racism in Canada, 1900-1950 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1999).
8. 2015 SCC 39, [2015] 2 SCR 789 [Bombardier].
9. For example, The Canadian Muslim Lawyers’ Association issued a press release noting 
that the Court’s affirmation of the possibility of unconscious bias, confirms that Canadian 
companies cannot “blindly comply with discriminatory decisions by a foreign authority” 
and its prima facie discrimination test would help protect future victims of discrimination. 
See Canadian Muslim Lawyers’ Association, Press Release, “Supreme Court Unanimously 
Affirms Correct Test for Discrimination” (24 July 2015) online: CMLA <cmla-acam.ca/
press-release-the-supreme-court-rules-in-latif-v-bombardier>.
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focused artificially on one and found “no evidence” of discrimination.10 The 
Court thus not only ended Captain Latif ’s quest for a remedy, it re-wrote his 
narrative by moving attention away from key facts regarding his interactions with 
Bombardier. The Court’s chosen narrative also relegated the collective fears and 
aspirations of Muslim communities in Canada to the realm of the unsaid.
At a time when Muslims are struggling to counter popular and official 
stereotypes that construct them as incorrigible barbarians and outsiders who 
are prone to terrorism and violence,11 it is important to create spaces for 
10. As Paul Daly points out, the Court used different language to express its disapproval of the 
Tribunal’s decision. Observing that the Court’s analysis looked like de novo review, Daly 
identifies the different expressions used by the Court in its analysis of the Tribunal’s reasons: 
“‘insufficient evidence’ (at para 84), evidence not ‘tangibly related’ (para 89), evidence ‘not 
sufficiently related’ (at para 89), or simply ‘no evidence’ (at para 99) … As usual, these are 
all faithful translations of the original French.” See Paul Daly, “Discrimination, Deference 
and Pluralism: Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. 
Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39” (24 July 2015), 




11. See e.g. John Geddes, “Canadian anti-Muslim sentiment is rising, disturbing new 
poll reveals,” Maclean’s (3 October 2013), online: <www.macleans.ca/politics/
land-of-intolerance>; Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination in Relation to Canada, UNCERD, 17th Sess, UN Doc CERD/C/
CAN/CO/18 (2007) at para 14, online: <www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/
CERD.C.CAN.CO.18.doc>; Chedly Belkhodja & Chantal Richard, “The Events of 
September 11 in the French-Canadian Press” (2006) 38:3 Can Ethnic Studies J 119; Helen 
R McClure, “Terrorist or Just a Piece of the Mosaic? Canada’s Discourse on ‘Arabs’” (Paper 
presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, 
2 March 2005), online: <www.allacademic.com/meta/p69415_index.html>; Alnoor Gova 
& Rahat Kurd, The Impact of Racial Profiling: A MARU Society / UBC Law Faculty Study, 
Metropolis British Columbia Working Paper Series No 08-14 (Vancouver: Metropolis 
British Columbia, 2008); Daood Hamdani, Triple Jeopardy: Muslim Women’s Experiences of 
Discrimination (Toronto: Canadian Council of Muslim Women, 2005), online: <archive.
ccmw.com/publications/triple_jeopardy.pdf>; Carenlee Barkdull et al, “Experiences of 
Muslims in Four Western Countries Post-9/11” (2011) 26:2 Affilia: J Women & Soc Work 
139; Peter Gottschalk & Gabriel Greenberg, Islamophobia: Making Muslims the Enemy 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); Reem Bahdi, “No Exit: Racial Profiling and 
Canada’s War against Terrorism” (2003) 41:2&3 Osgoode Hall LJ 293; Reem Bahdi et 
al, Racial Profiling (Vancouver: BC Civil Liberties Association, 2010), online: <bccla.org/
wp-content/uploads/2012/03/2007-BCCLA-Report-Racial-Profiling.pdf>; Ibrahim Kalin, 
“Islamophobia and the Limits of Multiculturalism” in John L Esposito & Ibrahim Kalin, eds, 
Islamophobia: The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011) 3; Sherene H Razack, Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslims from Western Law 
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counter-narratives to be heard and lived experiences to be validated. Moreover, 
litigants who dedicate years of their lives to advancing social justice causes deserve 
the dignity of being able to recognize their own stories when relayed back to 
them by the legal process.12 The comparison of the Court’s reasons with that of 
the Tribunal thus represents a political act of hearing counter-narratives while 
also critically analyzing the Supreme Court of Canada’s claim that the Tribunal 
had little or no evidence before it to ground its finding of discrimination.
I.  LATIF’S FALL FROM GRACE
With over twenty-five years’ experience, Latif was licenced to fly jumbo jets in 
both Canada and the United States.13 He qualified to fly under an FAA licence 
on 6 December 2003 at an American training facility. A Canadian citizen born 
in Pakistan, Captain Latif adheres to the Muslim faith. In March 2004, he was 
offered an employment contract as a pilot under his American pilot’s licence. 
Industry standards required him to refresh his training before the employment 
contract could be issued. Latif accordingly applied for training at Bombardier’s 
and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008); Uzma Jamil, “Discrimination 
experienced by Muslims in Ontario” (2012) 9:3 OHRC Diversity Mag, online: <www.
ohrc.on.ca/en/book/export/html/8782>; Yasmin Jiwani, “Barbarians in/of the Land: 
Representations of Muslim Youth in the Canadian Press” (2016) 11:1 J Contemp Issues 
in Education 36. The National Council of Canadian Muslims sued then Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper for libel and/or defamation for linking them to terrorism. See National 
Council of Canadian Muslims v Harper, 2015 ONSC 7185, 261 ACWS (3d) 51. Scholarly 
interest in the stereotyping of Arabs and/or Muslims in Canada has grown significantly 
over the last decade. See e.g. TY Ismael & John Measor, “Racism and the North American 
Media Following 11 September: The Canadian Setting” (2003) 25:1&2 Arab Studies Q 101; 
Denise Helly, “Are Muslims discriminated against in Canada since September 2001?” (2004) 
36:1 Can Ethnic Stud J 24.
12. On the question of dignity and misrecognition more generally, see Zoë Morrison, “On 
Dignity: Social Inclusion and the Politics of Recognition,” Centre for Public Policy 
Social Policy Working Paper No 12 (Melbourne: Brotherhood of St Laurence & Centre 
of Public Policy - University of Melbourne, 2010), online: <library.bsl.org.au/jspui/
bitstream/1/1942/1/Morrison_On_dignity_2010.pdf>; Charles Taylor, “The Politics of 
Recognition” in Amy Gutmann, ed, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994) 25 (“Due recognition is not just a courtesy 
we owe people. It is a vital human need” at 26); Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking Recognition” 
(2000) 3:3, New Left Rev 107 (demonstrating different analysis that links misrecognition to 
“social subordination” and justice but without using the term “dignity”).
13. Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse c Bombardier inc (Bombardier 
Aerospace Training Center), 2010 QCTDP 16 at para 7, [2011] RJQ 225 (CanLII) 
[Bombardier QCTDP].
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facility in Texas under his American licence. He needed security clearance from 
American national security officials in order to secure a place in the pilot training 
program. Even though he had received a clearance earlier, Latif ’s 2004 clearance 
request received no reply. American law required that Bombardier not approve 
Latif ’s training request at its Texas facility absent American security clearance, 
and Bombardier, rightly, refused to train Captain Latif at its Texas facility.
Still not approved for training in the United States, and unable to determine 
why his request for a clearance had been delayed, Latif decided to try to seek 
training through Bombardier’s training facility in Montreal. While he waited, 
he earned his Canadian pilot’s licence on 19 April 2004 from Transport Canada. 
He subsequently submitted a separate application for training in Montreal under 
his Canadian licence. Four days after receiving his Canadian licence, Latif heard 
from American officials about his request for training under his American licence: 
The US Department of Justice (DOJ) had refused his request for security clearance 
submitted under his American pilot’s licence. Though surprised, Captain Latif 
was not overly concerned. He had, after all, submitted an application for training 
in Canada under his Canadian licence. American officials had no jurisdiction 
over his request to obtain training in Canada under his Canadian licence.14 But 
he would soon face disappointment again. Bombardier refused to train him under 
his Canadian licence in Canada.15 Neither Canadian nor American laws required 
Bombardier to refuse Latif ’s request. Bombardier’s sole reason for refusing to 
train Latif in Canada was that American officials had refused Latif a security 
clearance in the United States.16 In refusing Latif training under his Canadian 
licence in Canada, Bombardier did not seek guidance from Canadian national 
security officials.17 As is generally the case in the national security context, secrecy 
shrouded the decision making and protected the decision makers. Neither 
Captain Latif nor Bombardier were told the reasons why American officials had 
refused Captain Latif training clearance. They were only told that he had been 
deemed a risk to national security.18 In other words, Captain Latif was presumed 
to be a potential terrorist.
By 2008, American officials cleared Latif.19 He was never a threat to 
American or Canadian national security. Although he had been provided with no 
14. Ibid at para 85.
15. Ibid at paras 83-87.
16. Ibid at para 287.
17. Ibid at para 336.
18. Ibid at para 88.
19. Ibid at para 126.
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official explanation for why he had been flagged as a national security threat, Latif 
speculated that American officials may have mistaken him for someone with a 
similar name. Both “Javed” and “Latif ” are exceptionally common names. Since 
the decision to flag Latif and the decision to clear him were both made in secret, 
Captain Latif could not know who had made the decision to flag or to clear him, 
or when, how, or why those decisions were made.
Listed as a potential terrorist by American officials and denied training by 
Bombardier in Canada, Captain Latif lost several employment contracts. His 
lawyer calculated his lost earnings at $905,155, which was the difference between 
the estimated worth of contracts lost and the actual salary he earned, most of 
which was outside of his profession of choice.20 Latif was also stigmatized and 
humiliated. News of his listing by American officials and Bombardier’s refusal to 
train him spread quickly and Captain Latif ’s solid reputation within the airline 
industry quickly fell apart. He had been tarred with the terrorist brush. People 
who had previously been his friends and colleagues shunned him. As he put it, 
he became persona non grata:
Subsequent to 2004, 2005, I stopped getting any job offers because by now, in the 
industry, it was known that Javed Latif is a persona non grata, has not been given 
clearance, maybe he’s undesirable and not to be given any job offers. Because this is 
a very small industry and unfortunately, the word travels very fast and it had been 
a long time that I had been denied in many denials and so, it was known around 
in the industry that I was not cleared. In fact, I had a job offer in between which I 
wasn’t able to take only for this reason, because recently, I had been given a refusal.21
Captain Latif ’s reputation now made it difficult to secure employment. 
He had to borrow money from his son and mortgage his house to make ends 
meet. His physical, emotional and mental health suffered:
I felt humiliated because people that I had known, worked with, was associated 
with, had interacted with, they washed their hands off [sic] me. They won’t recognize 
me or say they didn’t have time for me.
This was a humiliation. There were other factors. When there was no response from 
many agencies, many other people, I was humiliated because it became common 
knowledge that I had been probably as people understood it, a suspect, maybe a 
terrorist, maybe links with something [sic].22
20. Ibid at para 365.
21. Ibid at para 110.
22. Ibid at para 410.
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American officials advised Latif that there was little he could do to correct 
the predicament in which he found himself. There was no appeals process for 
non-US citizens.23
He sought recognition and remedy for the harm done to him by filing a 
complaint with the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la 
jeunesse. Unlike some of its counterparts (for example, in Ontario) the Quebec 
Human Rights Commission (“the Commission”) assumes carriage of complaints.24 
The Commission, acting on behalf of Latif and in the public interest, took his 
claim to a hearing before a Human Rights Tribunal. It alleged that Bombardier 
Inc (the Bombardier Aerospace Training Center) had interfered with Latif ’s right 
to be free from discrimination by refusing him training at its Canadian facility. 
The Commission argued that by refusing training to Latif, Bombardier interfered 
with his “right to the safeguard of his dignity and reputation, without distinction 
or exclusion based on ethnic or national origin, contrary to sections 4 and 10 
of the Charter.”25
II. NARRATIVES AND COUNTER-NARRATIVES
On 29 November 2010, after seven days of hearing, eight witnesses, and two 
expert reports, the Tribunal found that Bombardier had discriminated against 
Latif.26 In a decision that spanned 120 pages, the Tribunal ordered $25,000 
in moral damages, $309,798.72 USD for material prejudice (less $66,639 
Canadian dollars), and $50,000 in punitive damages. The Tribunal also issued an 
order requiring Bombardier to “cease applying or considering the standards and 
decisions of the US authorities in ‘national security’ matters when dealing with 
applications for the training of pilots under Canadian pilot’s licences.”27
The Tribunal’s decision set a precedent in many respects. Latif became one 
of the first successful, high profile Muslim human rights claimants. His story 
23. Ibid at para 93; Vision 100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub L No 108-176, 
§ 612(a), (c), 117 Stat 2490 (2003) [Vision 100].
24. See Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, “The Commission: 
Services and Activities,” online: <www.cdpdj.qc.ca/en/commission/services/
Pages/default.aspx>.
25. Bombardier QCTDP, supra note 13 at para 2.
26. In addition to my own expert report, the Tribunal considered an expert report by Mr. 
Bernard Siskin who testified on behalf of Bombardier. See ibid at paras 209-216.
27. Ibid at para 450. For the other elements of the judgment, see ibid at paras 
399, 405, 415, 442.
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was carried by national papers28 and signalled that Canada continued to care 
about injustices perpetrated in the name of national security. Maher Arar’s 
story had already sent a similar signal. Justice Dennis O’Connor’s 2006 report 
implicating Canadian officials in Arar’s detention and torture29 preceded Arar’s 
multi-million dollar settlement with the Canadian government.30 Arar’s story 
assured Canadians that, after the events of September 11, 2001 (“9/11”), Canada 
remained committed to human rights.
Shortly after 9/11, Canada rejected the official American strategy of explicitly 
exempting national security targets from human rights norms and due process. 
Rather than invoking the War Measures Act to suspend rights, Canadian officials 
responded to al-Qaeda’s attacks with Bill C-36, the Anti-terrorism Act, which 
was “carefully developed to combat terrorism, while ensuring that fundamental 
interests, such as privacy and other human rights, are respected.”31 In contrast, 
the United States, under the administration of George W Bush, carved out legal 
“black holes” or spaces in which human rights and due process were suspended. 
It sought to redefine the legal meaning of torture, facilitated the torture of 
detainees in Guantanamo Bay and beyond, created the concept of “unlawful 
enemy combatants” to defeat the application of the Geneva Conventions, 
approved of racial profiling, and limited access to information under the 
Presidential Records Act.32
28. “Bombardier fined for discrimination: Company to pay highest punitive penalty ever 
awarded by Quebec tribunal,” CBC News (8 December 2010), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/
business/bombardier-fined-for-discrimination-1.932063>; Ari Altstedter, “Blacklisted pilot 
wins rights case against Bombardier,” The Globe and Mail (8 December 2010), online: <www.
theglobeandmail.com/news/national/blacklisted-pilot-wins-rights-case-against-bombardier/
article1318877>. The Tribunal awarded Latif the largest punitive damage award in its history.
29. See Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher 
Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Factual Background, vol 1 & vol 2 (Ottawa: 
Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2006); Commission of Inquiry into the 
Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report of the Events Relating to 
Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services 
Canada, 2006 [Arar Report Recommendations].
30. “Ottawa reaches $10M settlement with Arar,” CBC News (25 January 2007), online: <www.
cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa-reaches-10m-settlement-with-arar-1.682875>.
31. Department of Justice Canada et al, The Anti-Terrorism Act: an act of prevention (Ottawa: 
Department of Justice Canada, 2002) at “Summary,” online: Public Safety Canada <www.
securitepublique.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/lbrr/ctlg/dtls-en.aspx?d=PS&i=14309286>. See also 
Anti-terrorism Act, SC 2001, c 41.
32. This paragraph is based on Reem Bahdi, “Before The Law: Creeping Lawlessness in Canadian 
Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy” in Vida Bajc & Willem de Lindt, eds, Security and Everyday 
Life (New York: Routledge, 2011) 143 at 144 [Bahdi, “Before the Law”]. See Presidential 
Records Act, 44 USC §§ 2201–2207 (1978).
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By contrast, Canadian officials insisted that Canada would strike a balance 
between human rights and national security; “while Americans derogated, 
Canadians balance.”33 But, signals between Canada’s official policy and Canadian 
reality became mixed at best after the release of the O’Connor Report in 2006. 
The official balancing rhetoric continued to be offered by Canadian officials even 
as people’s lives told a different story about the demise of human rights in the 
name of national security.  Canada’s refoulement or “extraordinary rendition” 
of Benamar Benatta, an innocent Algerian refugee, to the United States 
broke in 2007.34
Canadian Muslims had other reasons to ask whether violations of their rights 
and their experiences of discrimination would be recognized and remedied through 
law and legal processes. On 18 June 2009, The Standing Committee on National 
Security and Public Safety presented its report to the House of Commons which 
observed that Canada needed to recognize the harm done to Abdullah Almalki, 
Ahmad Abou-Elmaati, and Muayyed Nureddin by the involvement of Canadian 
officials in the men’s overseas torture and detention.35 The report recommended, 
among other things, that the men receive an apology and compensation, and 
that Canadian officials make efforts to correct the misinformation that had been 
circulated about the men between national security agencies in Canada and 
abroad. But the government took no action and, citing ongoing civil litigation, 
refused to comment on the recommendations.36
In this context, Latif ’s victory before the Tribunal in 2010 rekindled the 
hope that Islamophobia and stereotyping of Muslims would not be tolerated 
by Canadian society, that the havoc wreaked upon people’s lives by stereotypes 
would be recognized, and that the legal process would help make victims whole 
again, allowing people to start to reconstruct their shattered lives. The optimism 
33. Bahdi, “Before the Law,” supra note 32 at 155.
34. Ibid at 145-46.
35. House of Commons, Report of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National 
Security, Review of the Findings and Recommendations arising from the Iacobucci and O’Connor 
Inquiries (June 2009), online: <www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/402/SECU/
Reports/RP4004074/securp03/securp03-e.pdf>.
36. House of Commons, Government Response to the Report of the Standing Committee on 
Public Safety and National Security: Review of the Findings and Recommendations arising from 
the Iacobucci and O’Connor Inquiries (October 2009) at 14-15, online: <www.ourcommons.
ca/DocumentViewer/en/40-2/SECU/report-3/response-8512-402-123>. In March 2017, 
the Canadian Government apologized and compensated Almalki, El Maati, and Nureddin. 
See Jim Bronskill, “Ottawa compensates and apologizes to three Canadians tortured in 
Syria,” Toronto Star (17 March 2017), online: <www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/03/17/
ottawa-compensates-and-apologizes-to-three-canadians-tortured-in-syria.html>.
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generated by Latif ’s story proved short lived, however. The Court of Appeal of 
Quebec overturned the Tribunal’s findings in 2013.37 Then, in 2015, the Supreme 
Court of Canada upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision, finding that the Tribunal 
had little or no evidence of discrimination.38
Though he hired his own lawyer to represent him, Latif was not at the 
Supreme Court of Canada hearing. One can reasonably surmise that the decision 
was emotionally and financially devastating, perhaps contributing to a sense of 
alienation from and mistrust towards the legal system—a mistrust shared by other 
members of marginalized groups who have found that the legal system’s relative 
inability to understand their lived realities has a “spiralling and multiplying” 
effect, worsening their lives significantly.39 Captain Latif had dedicated over 
a decade to regaining his reputation and lost income, only to lose before the 
Supreme Court of Canada.
But losing a court case is one thing; losing through a decision that 
misunderstands your experiences seems quite another. The Court narrowed the 
facts and issues relied upon by the Tribunal to the point of redefining them. How 
is it that the highest court in the land can re-shape the facts so strictly that it 
amounts to a re-framing of the narrative and a re-casting of the issues? In part, 
the answer lies in the nature of appellant review.40 The Court, of course, does not 
and cannot reconsider all the facts that were put before the Tribunal, nor can 
it have regard for all the Tribunal’s reasons.41 By necessity, the facts and issues 
raised in any case will be selected and edited. Nonetheless, courts, including the 
Supreme Court of Canada, generally defer to human rights tribunals, particularly 
on findings of fact, because tribunals have the benefit of directly examining the 
37. Bombardier inc (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center) c Commission des droits de la personne 
et des droits de la jeunesse, 2013 QCCA 1650 at para 162, 237 ACWS (3d) 181.
38. Bombardier, supra note 8 at para 98.
39. Amanda Dodge, “Access to Justice Metrics Informed by the Voices of Marginalized 
Community Members: Themes, Definitions and Recommendations Arising from 
Community Consultations” (prepared for the Canadian Bar Association’s Access to Justice 
Committee, March 2013) at 8, online: Canadian Bar Association <www.cba.org/CBA/
cle/PDF/JUST13_Paper_Dodge.pdf> citing Leonard T Doust, Foundation for Change: 
Report of the Public Commission on Legal Aid in British Columbia (Vancouver: Public 
Commission of Legal Aid, 2011) at 21, online: Public Commission of Legal Aid <www.
publiccommission.org/media/pdf/pcla_report_03_08_11.pdf>.
40. See generally Paul Daly, “The Struggle for Deference in Canada” in Mark Elliott & Hanna 
Wilberg, eds, The Scope and Intensity of Substantive Review: Traversing Taggart’s Rainbow 
(Oxford: Hart, 2015) 297.
41. See Ledcor Construction Ltd v Northbridge Indemnity Insurance Co, 2016 SCC 37, 
[2016] 2 SCR 23.
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evidence. In Bombardier, however, the Court appeared unwilling to defer to even 
the Tribunal’s findings on key facts. At one point, for example, the Court referred 
to one of the Tribunal’s main findings of fact as an “allegation.”42 By reading the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s silences, I aim to demonstrate that the Court edited 
too much out of the Tribunal decision, and that these edits raise questions about 
the nature and scope of the Court’s review of this case. Indeed, some human 
rights, judicial review and administrative law scholars, and commentators have 
been troubled by the Court’s finding that there was “no evidence” to justify the 
Tribunal’s conclusions.43
My primary interest in Bombardier lies beyond doctrinal analysis. Bombardier 
reveals the extent to which Canadian courts prove unwilling to reject the narrative 
that Muslims represent a threat to Canada and national security. Bombardier 
allows us to remain content that we continue to strike a balance between national 
security and human rights while our American neighbours call for increasingly 
restrictive and retrograde national security measures at the expense of equality 
and human rights values. After all, even as Captain Latif lost, the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Bombardier affirmed the central role that human rights 
must play in Canada’s social and political order, even in the face of national 
security. He purportedly lost simply because the Court was not presented with 
sufficient evidence.
But, a reading of the Supreme Court of Canada’s silences in Bombardier 
demonstrates that while American rights derogations operate explicitly, our post 
9/11 derogations can be constructed through silence and silencing. National 
security exceptionalism can operate implicitly or covertly within the law rather 
than outside of it. Bombardier illustrates that silence can contribute to our 
national narrative of a country that post-9/11 continues to respect rights, while 
simultaneously denying the ongoing stereotyping of Muslims and their inability 
to seek protection before the law.
My reading of the silences in the Court’s Bombardier decision proceeds by 
comparing the frames given to Captain Latif ’s story by the Supreme Court of 
Canada and the Quebec Human Rights Tribunal respectively and pointing to the 
ways in which the Court edited out the Tribunal’s findings of fact and reasoning.
42. See Bombardier QCTDP, supra note 13 at para 138, 160; Bombardier, supra note 8 
at paras 95-97.
43. See e.g. David Dias, “SCC sets high burden of proof for racial profiling” (23 July 
2015), Legal Feeds (blog), online: <www.canadianlawyermag.com/legalfeeds/2810/
scc-sets-high-burden-of-proof-for-racial-profiling.html>; Daly, supra note 10.
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A. A TALE OF TWO THEORIES
Quebec’s Human Rights Tribunal understood Latif ’s case as an opportunity to 
recognize Islamophobia in Canada and to affirm that Canadian law, unlike its 
American counterpart, should not further national security exceptionalism. Its 
reasons for finding against Bombardier rested on two intersecting but discrete 
theories. The first can be called profiling by proxy: Bombardier served as a conduit 
for American profiling practices. The second can be called the Gignac Conduct 
Theory: Bombardier’s Head of Standards and Regulatory Compliance, Stephen 
Gignac, stereotyped Captain Latif as a terrorist and failed to make reasonable 
inquiries regarding Latif with Canadian officials because he had already concluded 
that Latif posed a threat to national security.
In its appearance before the Supreme Court of Canada, the Commission 
argued that the record contained sufficient evidence of Bombardier’s 
discrimination even without considering American profiling practices. In short, 
one could simply focus on Latif ’s treatment by Bombardier officials in Canada to 
make a finding of discrimination.44 Acting as interveners, the National Council of 
Canadian Muslims (“NCCM”) and the Canadian Muslims Lawyers Association 
(“CMLA”) also focused on the actions of Canadian officials and Bombardier’s 
decision-making, not that of American officials.  The groups urged the Court 
to take the opportunity to denounce the stereotyping of Muslims as terrorists in 
Canada. They pointed out, for example, the ways in which Mr. Gignac easily and 
fluidly equated Captain Latif with the 9/11 hijackers.45
The NCCM/CMLA factum told the narrative of a community harmed by 
bias and the “reproduction of stereotypes:”
The cascading effects of stereotyping and discriminatory stigma easily become 
routinized in society and embedded in common assumptions. This has been the 
experience of North American Muslims in the post-9/11 era. Canadian Muslims have 
experienced heightened vulnerability as a result of the reproduction of stereotypes 
linking Muslims to radical ideology and national security threats. These stereotypes 
have persisted despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of Canadian Muslims 
44. Bombardier, supra note 8 (Factum of the Appellant, Commission des droits de la personne  
et des droits de la jeunesse at para 97), online: <www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-Documents 
Web/35625/FM010_Appelante_Commission-des-droits-de-la-personne-et-des-droits-de-la-
jeunesse.pdf> [Commission Factum].
45. Bombardier, supra note 8 (Factum of the Interveners, National Council of Canadian Muslims 
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are peaceful, law-abiding citizens and residents, who pose no greater risk of harm to 
the public than members of any other group.46
Given such community experiences, it is not surprising that the NCCM 
and CMLA regarded Bombardier as an opportunity to seek judicial recognition 
of Islamophobia within Canada. Presenting from a community perspective, the 
groups stressed that “Islamophobia has, like anti-Black racism and anti-Semitism, 
gained widespread recognition as a social fact in contemporary Canadian society.”47
Captain Latif ’s story understandably resonated in Muslim communities 
for several reasons. Yet another innocent Muslim Canadian found himself the 
victim of the “war against terrorism” because he had been wrongly labeled. 
The fear of being “Arar’ed” had already left its mark on Muslim (and Arab) 
communities in Canada.48 Moreover, stereotyping sends a distinct message to 
whole communities: Racialized and other equality-seeking groups experience 
stereotyping as control-acts that, in the words of Patricia Williams, lead to “spirit 
murder.”49 Stereotyping also reveals and reinforces patterns of exclusion that 
construct members of equality-seeking groups as “non-citizens” or “outsiders” 
regardless of their socio-economic status, their contributions to Canada, or the 
strength and duration of their relationships with Canada.50 These discriminatory 
moments are not, in short, simply isolated moments of discomfort or even 
markers of deeper hurt. These moments go to the heart of social being and 
belonging. Judicial recognition of stereotypes by courts and tribunals can help 
counter group marginalization by naming and renouncing the stereotype. 
Naming and renouncing represent acts of counter-narration.
However, the Supreme Court of Canada did not see Bombardier as 
an opportunity to denounce the stereotyping of Muslims in Canada. The 
stereotyping of Muslims as terrorists in Canada remained outside the Court’s field 
46. Ibid at para 3.
47. Ibid at para 14.
48. The term “Arar’ed” was coined by Faisal Joseph and refers to the interpretation of innocent 
actions through the lens of stereotyping and Islamophobia. I adopted Joseph’s term in my 
testimony before the Arar Inquiry. See e.g. Neco Cockburn, “Muslims, Arabs fear being 
‘Arar’ed’, inquiry told,” The Ottawa Citizen (10 June 2005) A7.
49. Williams, supra note 7 at 73.
50. See Reem Bahdi, “Constructing non-citizens: the living law of anti-terrorism in Canada” 
in Jenny Hocking & Colleen Lewis, eds, Counter-Terrorism and the Post-Democratic State 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007) 81.
 571
of vision.51 The Court had agreed to hear Bombardier because the case offered “its 
first opportunity to consider a form of discrimination allegedly arising out of 
a decision of a foreign authority.”52 By choosing to focus on Americans and 
American decision-making, the Court demonstrated its desire to have a different 
conversation than the one presented by the Tribunal, the Commission, or the 
interveners. In the process, the Court ultimately reframed the facts and issues 
presented by Bombardier.
The story of the Court’s reframing of the facts and issues in Latif ’s case has 
multiple potential starting points. One might start with the Court’s own emphasis 
on a single word, “solely.” The Court indicated that it would focus on American 
decision-making because the parties agreed that “Bombardier’s decision to deny 
Mr. Latif ’s request for training was based solely on DOJ’s refusal to issue him a 
security clearance.”53 Curiously, the Court employs the term “solely” four times, 
italicizing it twice for emphasis, when referencing Bombardier’s actions.54 With 
its sight narrowed on “solely,” the Supreme Court of Canada restricted the issues 
before it to whether Bombardier had profiled Captain Latif by proxy, serving 
as a conduit for American discriminatory practices. The Court thus focused its 
decision, artificially, on whether American profiling practices had been proven 
and, if so, whether a link had been established between those practices and 
Latif ’s predicament.
But, read in light of the Commission’s arguments as a whole, the Tribunal’s 
decision, and the intervener arguments, the statement “Mr. Latif ’s request for 
51. See Bombardier, supra note 8 at paras 95-96. Indeed, rather than denouncing 
Muslim stereotypes, the Court itself drew close to invoking the “sleeper cell” trope, 
at paragraphs 95 and 96:
[95] The Commission adds that Mr. Latif ’s spotless record is incompatible with the conclusion 
that he posed a threat to aviation or national security in the United States. In its view, this, 
combined with the rest of the evidence, shows that his ethnic or national origin was a factor 
in DOJ’s refusal of his request.
[96] We cannot accept this argument. The refusal by the U.S. authorities was intended to 
protect the national security of the United States. Mr. Latif ’s career record up to that time 
was not determinative of the threat he might pose to national security any more than were the 
many FAAapproved training courses he had taken in the past.
 It is worth noting that the Commission did not indicate that Captain Latif ’s spotless record 
should be “determinative” but rather should have signalled, “combined with the rest of the 
evidence,” that American decision-making was suspect. See also NCCM & CMLA Factum, 
supra note 45 at para 13.
52. Bombardier, supra note 8 at para 2.
53. Ibid at para 80 [emphasis in original].
54. Ibid at paras 15, 27, 74, 80. The Court italicized the term “solely” at paras 74 and 80.
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training was based solely on DOJ’s refusal to issue him a security clearance,”55 
should have been understood simply as a factual statement: Bombardier refused 
Latif training because American authorities had refused him a clearance. 
Bombardier provided no other explanation or justification for refusing Latif 
training. Within the context of the Tribunal’s reasons, the word “solely” 
indicates that American decision-making triggered Bombardier’s decisions. 
Bombardier, in short, profiled by proxy. By implication, if Americans did not 
profile Latif, neither did Bombardier. But the Tribunal made clear that American 
decision-making was not the only decision-making process under scrutiny. 
Bombardier’s discriminatory actions merited scrutiny in and of themselves, 
independent of American profiling practices. Much of the Tribunal’s analysis 
therefore focused on the assumptions and the conduct of Gignac towards Latif. 
The Tribunal understood Latif ’s predicament as a function of Gignac’s conduct 
and expounded a set of reasons, or theory of discrimination, rooted in its factual 
findings of Gignac’s actions and inaction. In essence, it found that Latif was 
discriminated against through Gignac’s conduct. Yet the Court, by relegating 
the Tribunal’s Gignac Conduct Theory to the realm of the unsaid, took “solely” 
to mean that only the “profiling by proxy” theory was relevant to Latif ’s claim. 
Even so, the Court did not consider much of the evidence that had convinced the 
Tribunal that Latif had indeed been profiled by proxy.
B. PROFILING BY PROXY
Profiling by proxy centres the discrimination analysis on the United States. 
It imagines Bombardier as a neutral medium that simply gave effect to American 
decision-making.
The Court held that there was no evidence suggesting that American officials 
had profiled Latif based on his identity.56 It rejected the notion that evidence of 
social context could be used to form the link between the impugned decision and 
Captain Latif ’s identity because it did not want to undermine the principle that 
complainants must establish a prima facie case. Specifically, the Court worried 
that a finding of discrimination in the instant case based on a pattern of behaviour 
exhibited by others in similar circumstances would, in effect, reverse the burden 
of proof by requiring respondents to demonstrate that their behaviour did not 
conform to a pattern established through social context evidence.57
55. Ibid at para 80 [emphasis in original].
56. Ibid at para 99.
57. Ibid at para 88.
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The Court wanted more information about the regulation of pilot training 
by American authorities.58 Clarity was needed, for example, about the relevance 
of Vision 100 to Latif ’s case. Though it did not explicitly say so, presumably the 
Court wanted more information about the mechanics of decision-making under 
Vision 100 and predecessor programs. Signed into law by George W Bush on 12 
December 2003, Vision 100 addressed a significant number of aviation-related 
issues, including matters such as procurement and employment.59 Section 612, 
as the Tribunal noted, “aimed at the adoption of new security standards.”60 But, 
the Court wanted information that pilot training programs discriminated against 
Muslims or evidence that Latif himself had been discriminated against when 
decisions were made about his particular case.
However the Court did not address the fact that decisions in the national 
security context are made in secret and that details about programs are not 
publicly available. Thus, proof of discrimination, particularly direct proof, 
is almost impossible to obtain. Nor did the Court address the significant power 
imbalance between American national security agencies and the Commission. 
Put simply, American officials held all the cards. They had virtually unfettered 
access to information about Captain Latif, while the Commission and Latif had 
no access to any information about his case—including the reasons why American 
officials decided to name him a threat to national security. As we already know 
from Maher Arar’s case, American officials will not cooperate with Canadian 
requests for national security related information, even in legal proceedings.
Latif was never told why he was denied training. Ironically, the unsaid in 
the Commission’s case, independent of the ability to say it, erased the efficacy 
of the evidence that was put before the Court. Unlike the Supreme Court of 
Canada, the Tribunal did not require the Commission or Captain Latif to pull 
back the curtain on American decision-making. The Tribunal recognized that the 
evidence available about Captain Latif ’s experience would be limited by national 
security confidentiality and power differences.61 The Tribunal concluded that it 
had sufficient information about national security decision-making to make a 
reasonable inference that Captain Latif, more likely than not, had been profiled 
when he was identified as a threat to American national security.
58. Ibid at para 87.
59. George W Bush, “Statement on Signing the Vision 100—Century of Aviation 
Reauthorization Act” (Statement delivered at The White House, 12 December 2003), online: 
The American Presidency Project <www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64197>.
60. Bombardier QCTDP, supra note 13 at para 149.
61. Ibid at para 207.
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In considering the nature and dynamics of stereotyping of Muslims in the 
American national security context, the Tribunal acknowledged that profiling 
of Muslims takes various forms. After 9/11, several programs directly targeted 
Muslims. For example,
One of the largest programs adopted, the National Security Exit and Entry 
Registration System (NSEERS), requires non-US citizens from specific countries 
identified as Arab or Muslim to register with the US Department of Immigration 
when they enter the country and periodically after that. The constraints of the 
program require, in particular, that photographs and fingerprints be taken, interviews 
be conducted on departure and arrival, and checks be made in several databanks.62
Canadian officials were sufficiently concerned about NSEERS that they took 
the highly unusual step of issuing a travel warning to Canadian traveling to the 
United States. They warned:
Canadians who were born in [Arab or Muslim] … countries or who may be citizens 
of these countries to consider carefully whether they should attempt to enter the 
United States for any reason, including transit to or from third countries.63
In addition, a Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, 
commenting on NSEERS, noted that the program unfairly targets individuals 
because of their identity: “If the United States does not have a reasonable doubt 
about someone’s activities, country of birth should not be taken into account.”64
However, the Tribunal acknowledged that the profiling of Muslims in the 
United States did not end there; it took other forms outside of specific programs 
that openly targeted Arabs and Muslims.65 When programs such as NSEERS were 
eventually formally revoked, profiling practices continued because Americans 
accepted profiling as a law enforcement method and terrorism prevention tool. 
Profiling thus became more diffuse and difficult to locate—but easier to deny—
precisely because it took place in the context of seemingly neutral programs 
that did not explicitly target specific identities. Driven by stereotypes, profiling 
manifested itself at the operational level where decision-making, though difficult 
to document at the best of times, remained shrouded behind secrecy.
The Tribunal acknowledged that Muslims are stereotyped as terrorists in 
the United States and that this stereotyping is evident in both the public and 
private spheres and colours decision-making. Citing Supreme Court of Canada 
62. Ibid at para 192.
63. Ibid at para 194 citing Elise Labott, “Canada Issues US Travel Warning,” CNN (30 October 
2002), online: <www.cnn.com/2002/TRAVEL/10/30/canada.us.travel>.
64. Bombardier QCTDB, supra note 13 at para 79.
65. See ibid at paras 182-208.
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jurisprudence, the Tribunal emphasized that “[r]acial prejudice and its effects are 
as invasive and elusive as they are corrosive” and that “one must not ‘underestimate 
the insidious nature of racial prejudice and the stereotyping that underlies it.’”66
The Tribunal also found that American legislators themselves worried that 
law enforcement agencies were targeting Muslims after 9/11 and made note of 
anti-profiling legislative efforts:
Recognizing the problems created by racial profiling after the attacks of 2001, 14 
Democratic senators tabled a bill aimed at countering that phenomenon. Paragraph 
16 of Bill 2481, The End of Racial Profiling Act of 2007, provides for the following:
In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, many Arabs, Muslims, 
Central and South Asians, and Sikhs, as well as other immigrants and Americans of 
foreign descent, were treated with generalized suspicion and subjected to searches and 
seizures based upon religion and national origin without trustworthy information 
linking specific individuals to criminal conduct. Such profiling has failed to produce 
tangible benefits, yet has created a fear and mistrust of law enforcement agencies in 
these communities.67
The Tribunal also noted that the US Senators proved unsuccessful in their 
bid to legislate against the profiling of Muslims and others whose identities were, 
rightly or wrongly, linked to 9/11 in the public imagination.68
Similarly, a Policy Guidance issued by the DOJ that sought to prohibit 
racial profiling with the exception of profiling in the national security context proved 
particularly troubling for the Tribunal:
Paradoxically, the emergence of a new tolerance for stereotypes and the racial 
profiling of Arabs and Muslims is obvious in the policies adopted in June 2003 by 
the DOJ. For example, despite the fact that the objective of the Policy Guidance 
to Ban Racial Profiling is to prohibit public decision makers from engaging in 
racial profiling, the policy also provides for an explicit exception in matters of 
national security, whereas it is acknowledged that the racial profiling of Arabs and 
Muslims mainly involves matters of national security …69
The Tribunal found the timing of the Policy Guidance important because it 
was produced precisely as Latif ’s ordeal began, thereby reinforcing the idea that 
66. Ibid at para 247 citing R v Williams, [1998] 1 SCR 1128, 159 CLR (4th) 493 at paras 21-22.
67. Bombardier QCTDB, supra note 13 at para 204.
68. Ibid at para 205.
69. Ibid at para 203.
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profiling did not disappear as 9/11 moved further into history.70 The Tribunal 
accepted that even if decision-makers are not directed to profile Muslims, they 
have permission to do so. “Hence,” it concluded, “the final result is that this 
category of people is excluded from the protection of the law.”71
The Tribunal also made note of the extensive reliance on watch lists within 
American national security programming. These lists raised concerns for the 
Tribunal in part because the listing practices were fraught with inconsistencies 
and irrationalities which resulted in under-inclusion of those who might be 
dangerous and over-inclusion of those who posed no threat. For example, the 
Tribunal discussed miscommunications between the FBI and the US National 
Counterterrorism Center:
In addition to its watch list nomination activities, the FBI prepares terrorist-related 
intelligence reports that it disseminates throughout the Intelligence Community. 
Although the FBI did not intend for these reports to be official nominations, NCTC 
[National Counterterrorism Center] officials informed us that they considered this 
information from the FBI to constitute official watchlist records from these reports 
and sourced them to the FBI. However, because the FBI was not aware of this 
NCTC practice, the FBI was not monitoring the records to ensure that they were 
updated or removed when necessary.72
Moreover, the Tribunal noted that there was no appeal procedure for 
non-US citizens.73
Ultimately, the Tribunal found a number of reasons that explained why 
Latif, an innocent man, found himself on a terrorist watch list, unable to set 
the record straight with American officials for years. These reasons include: 
approval for racial profiling either directly in the US DOJ’s Policy Guidance 
or indirectly through the failed bid to end racial profiling as a tool of national 
security law enforcement and prevention; irrational policies and practices that 
produced overly broad terrorist watch lists; lack of meaningful quality assurance 
or oversight of terrorist watch lists; and stereotyping. These factors also explained 
the inconsistent decision-making experienced by Latif at the hands of American 
authorities between 2003 and 2004. Given the facts before it, the Tribunal drew 
an inference that Latif had been profiled by American decision-makers.
70. Whereas Mr. Latif had been cleared by the US Department of Justice in October 2003, 
he was refused in March 2004 when aviation security measures became stricter with the 
coming into force of Vision 100, supra note 23. This statute was aimed at preventing terrorist 
attacks. See Bombardier QCTDB, supra note 13 at para 304.
71. Ibid at para 203.
72. Ibid at para 198, n 82.
73. Ibid at para 93.
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The Tribunal’s concerns about the profiling of Muslims in the national security 
context should hardly be surprising in a post-Arar world. Justice O’Connor had 
cautioned against profiling in his highly publicized report, which found that 
Canadian officials played a role in Arar’s detention and torture in Syria:
Although this may change in the future, anti-terrorism investigations at present 
focus largely on members of the Muslim and Arab communities. There is therefore 
an increased risk of racial, religious or ethnic profiling, in the sense that the race, 
religion or ethnicity of individuals may expose them to investigation. Profiling in 
this sense would be at odds with the need for equal application of the law without 
discrimination and with Canada’s embrace of multiculturalism. Profiling that relies 
on stereotypes is also contrary to the need discussed above for relevant, reliable, 
accurate and precise information in national security investigations. Profiling based 
on race, religion or ethnicity is the antithesis of good policing or security intelligence 
work.74
Like Justice O’Connor, the Tribunal sent the message that, while profiling 
may be an acceptable practice in the United States, it is not in Canada.
Significantly, the Tribunal did not revert to a reverse onus to reach its 
discrimination finding.75 It drew inferences about American decision-making 
based on the testimony of Captain Latif, Bombardier officials, and expert 
reports. It concluded that in all the circumstances of the case, Latif ’s failure 
to secure a clearance was more likely than not linked to American profiling 
practices. Bombardier tried to raise doubt about whether profiling of Muslims 
is widespread in the United States. It argued that since Latif had been issued a 
certificate in 2003, his Muslim identity could not have been the reason for his 
being refused in 2004. Bombardier’s expert, a statistician, urged the Tribunal to 
base its conclusions on established statistics and argued there was insufficient 
statistical evidence to conclude that profiling exists or that Latif was profiled.76
Rejecting Bombardier’s arguments, the Tribunal pointed out that 
discrimination in Canada, unlike the United States, does not depend on the 
intent to discriminate.77 The fact that Captain Latif (and other Muslims) had 
at one point been granted training does not exclude the possibility that a denial 
of training at another point can be discriminatory. The decision to deny at any 
point can be influenced by stereotyping, and stereotyping constitutes a form of 
74. Arar Report Recommendations, supra note 29 at 356.
75. A good argument can be made that a reverse onus would in fact be appropriate in the 
national security context given that information is not readily available to complainants but 
remains in the hands of national security agencies.
76. Bombardier QCTDP, supra note 13 at paras 214-15.
77. Ibid at para 234.
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discrimination. Similarly, the Tribunal rejected the suggestion that statistical 
evidence was necessary to establish discrimination. Had the Tribunal accepted 
that the case should be driven by statistics, it would have placed another access 
to justice barrier before marginalized communities in Canada. A reliance on 
statistics in the human rights contexts obscures the question of whose experiences 
count and raises further cost barriers for the most marginalized. In any event, 
even if statistics might be demanded of human rights claimants, the national 
security context does not easily yield to statistical analysis. One cannot tally those 
things that are hidden from view.
In reviewing the Tribunal’s reasons and remedy, the Court made some 
welcome observations, in the abstract, about the nature of stereotyping as a 
general matter. In particular, it reinforced that implicit or unconscious biases can 
produce discrimination. The Court’s analysis begins with an acknowledgement 
of the complexity of discrimination: “Discrimination can take a variety of forms. 
Although some of them are easy to identify, others are less obvious, such as those 
that result from unconscious prejudices and stereotypes or from standards that 
are neutral on their face but have adverse effects on certain persons.”78 However, 
the Court did not develop the concept of “unconscious prejudices or stereotypes” 
further or consider the ways in which “unconscious prejudices or stereotypes” 
arose in the case before it. Without engaging in an inquiry about stereotypes and 
stereotyping, the Court concluded that there was “no evidence” that Latif had 
been denied training for discriminatory reasons.79
In setting out its reasons, the Court gave significant space to Bombardier’s 
argument that Captain Latif had simply been the victim of mistaken identity—or, 
to use the Court’s distancing language, an “identification error”—even though 
Latif ’s factum on appeal stressed that he never knew the reasons why he was 
denied or granted clearances in 2003, 2004, or 2008.80 The Court ignored the 
Tribunal’s observation that mistaken identities in the national security context are 
78. Bombardier, supra note 8 at para 1.
79. With respect to my report, the Court noted that “[a]t best, the report showed that, at the 
time, there was a social climate in which racial profiling was generalized for national security 
purposes as a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and that racial profiling 
was practised in certain U.S. government programs.” Ibid at para 87. The significance of the 
words “social climate,” as opposed to “social context” is not clear; perhaps it delineates this 
case from other cases in which “social context” proved a persuasive, albeit not dispositive, 
source of evidence. The Court does not mention that American law approves of racial 
profiling in the national security context.




themselves racially charged given the undeniable problem of over inclusiveness 
in the identification and listing of potential terrorists in the United States.81 
Having declared that the discrimination arose “solely” out of Latif ’s treatment 
by American officials and unconvinced that the Americans had profiled Latif, 
the Court could not hold Bombardier liable for profiling by proxy. It denied 
Latif a remedy.
But the profiling by proxy narrative does not tell the full story as heard, 
understood, and conveyed by the Quebec Human Rights Tribunal. Indeed, 
the Commission explained to the Supreme Court of Canada that there was 
sufficient evidence of discrimination in Captain Latif ’s case as recognized by 
the Tribunal even without regard for stereotyping and profiling of Muslims in 
the United States.
C. GIGNAC CONDUCT THEORY
Much of the Tribunal’s decision rested on a finding that Gignac, Bombardier’s 
Head of Standards and Regulatory Compliance in Montreal, held stereotypical 
views of Captain Latif that were rooted in a preconception that Muslims are 
prone to violence and terrorism. While an American decision triggered Gignac’s 
decision to refuse Latif application for training, American profiling practices were 
not the only source of stereotyping in Latif ’s story.
Gignac testified to the actions he had taken to prevent Latif from receiving 
training and how he had informed Latif ’s prospective employers of the American 
decision to deny Latif training. For example, on 12 May 2004, Gignac advised 
Latif ’s potential employer in writing that training would be refused:
Reference: Javed Latif
To Whom It May Concern,
It is with regret that we have to inform you that Mr. Javed Latif has been denied 
pilot training by the US Department of Justice (US DOJ). Reasons for denial have 
not been divulged to us. Due to our US Certificate of operation, the Bombardier 
Aerospace Training Centre must comply with the US DOJ request for any type of 
pilot training.
We will continue to monitor Mr. Latif ’s situation and will advise him of any change 
in this status. Please feel free to contact the undersigned should you have any 
questions.
Yours sincerely,
81. Bombardier, supra note 8 at paras 83, 84.
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Steven Gignac
Head of Standards & Regulatory Compliance
Copies to: Mr. Javed Latif
Serge Boudreault, Business Aircraft Pilot Training Manager
Hank Blasiak, General Manager Bombardier Aerospace Training82
In his testimony, Gignac explained that no laws or policies in Canada or the 
United States required Bombardier to deny Latif training in Canada under his 
Canadian licence.83 American law prohibited Captain Latif from taking training 
in the United States and Americans had jurisdiction over Latif ’s American 
licence, but Americans had no jurisdiction in Canadian licences in Canada. 
Canadian law did not prohibit Latif from training in Canada notwithstanding 
the decisions of American officials. Neither American nor Canadian law, in other 
words, extended American decision-making to Canada. Nonetheless, Gignac 
took it upon himself to deny the training. When asked to point to a policy to 
justify acting the way that he did, Gignac replied “I’m the policy.”84
Gignac explained that he took his position vis-à-vis Latif for two reasons. 
First, he was concerned that Bombardier would lose its licence to operate in the 
United States if American officials lacked confidence in Bombardier.85 Second, 
Gignac indicated that he had a moral responsibility “as a ‘citizen’” to prevent 
Captain Latif from receiving training to prevent another 9/11-style attack.86
Gignac explained that he corresponded or met regularly with American 
officials and made particular note of a meeting on 30 September 2004 
organized by the US Transport Security Agency and the US Department of 
Homeland Security:
[TRANSLATION]
They wanted to know precisely whether, how we were going to stop those people, what 
were [IN ENGLISH] the requirements, why this is happening. [TRANSLATION] 
And they responded that it was the law, it was the new law; the administration did not 
want another September 11 to occur.87
82. Bombardier QCTDP, supra note 13 at para 88 [emphasis omitted].
83. Ibid at para 132.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid at para 158.
86. Ibid at para 161-62.
87. Ibid at para 153 [emphasis in original].
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“Those people” were not defined but presumably the term meant potential 
terrorists in the vein of the 9/11 hijackers who—as is well known—were Muslims.
Gignac also testified that he had developed his own suspicions about 
Captain Latif, and that he specifically suspected that Latif was a terrorist in 
waiting. The Tribunal paid particular attention to Gignac’s testimony concerning 
his attitudes and views of Captain Latif, citing the hearing transcript at various 
points directly in its decision. For example, the Tribunal referenced the following 
transcript excerpts to illustrate that Gignac had reached the conclusion that 
Latif was dangerous:
Q. Okay. To your mind, when the TSA refused Mr. Latif ’s application,
A. Hmm, hmm.
Q. … that meant Mr. Latif was considered a potential terrorist?
A. Yes, a potential terrorist, I could not—he’s refused—yes, a potential terrorist.
Q. When you received the TSA’s response . . .
A. Yes, yes.
Q. ... that’s what you thought?
A. Yes.
Q. And your decision not to train him under a Canadian licence was based on that 
idea you had?
A. Absolutely.88
Ironically, given the Supreme Court of Canada’s later concern about creating 
a reverse onus, in this instance Gignac required Latif to prove his innocence. 
Further, Gignac’s testimony demonstrated that he considered himself a private 
national security agent and an ally of American authorities:
In that regard, Mr. Gignac said he went to Washington two or three times a year 
to meet with the US authorities. He indicated that, without [TRANSLATION] 
“putting himself on a pedestal”, few people in Canada [TRANSLATION] “meet 
with the [US] authorities” about statutes ...89
Given that he was acting without legal authority, the tribunal reasoned that 
Gignac should not have accepted the American decision-making without some 
inquiries.90 It would have been reasonable, given American concerns, for Gignac 
88. Ibid at para 299.
89. Ibid at para 145.
90. Ibid at para 335.
(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL582
to ask further questions about Captain Latif. However, it was not reasonable 
for Gignac to extend American authority to Latif ’s Canadian licence nor for 
Gignac to conclude that Latif was a potential terrorist. In particular, the Tribunal 
wondered why Gignac failed to consult with Canadian national security officials 
about whether Latif could train under his Canadian licence in Canada.91 The 
Tribunal noted that Gignac was in regular contact with Canadian national security 
agencies and that he could have easily made formal inquiries about Latif.92
If he had consulted with Canadian officials who were readily available to 
him, Gignac might have been disabused of his concerns about Captain Latif—or 
at least disabused of his view that he had the authority to deny Latif training. 
Even though he testified that he considered Captain Latif to be “like a brother,” 
Gignac’s conduct betrayed a wanton disregard for Captain Latif ’s interests and 
a fear of his identity: “I know Mr. Latif like a brother, but what happened in 48 
hours, I couldn’t do anything. I wasn’t with him. So I couldn’t go so far as to say 
that he was not a terrorist.”93
The Tribunal concluded that Gignac enthusiastically accepted the American 
decision and failed to consult with Canadian authorities because he assumed that 
Muslims have a propensity for terrorism. In short, he required Captain Latif to 
demonstrate that he was not a terrorist and refused to accept any responsibility 
for Latif ’s predicament. Gignac’s testimony revealed not only the views and 
attitudes expressed by American officials at their meeting,94 his testimony also 
revealed that he welcomed the American approach because of his own beliefs. 
Accordingly, the Tribunal found that Gignac was not simply the passive conduit 
of American decision-making. He was actively operating under the stereotypes 
that Muslims are prone to violence and shared the same generalized fears and 
misapprehension about Muslim propensity for terrorism as revealed in American 
laws, policies, and practices.95
The Tribunal found that Gignac adopted an “absolute security” approach, 
wherein security fears overshadow and override individual rights without 
question.96 The Tribunal contrasted the absolute security approach with the 
Canadian model of balancing rights and security. It stressed that Gignac,
91. Ibid at para 336.
92. Ibid at para 160.
93. Ibid at para 140.
94. Ibid at para 145.
95. Ibid at para 301.
96. Ibid at para 334.
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[N]ever tried to know whether Mr. Latif objectively constituted a risk to the security 
[TRANSLATION] “of Canadians or aviation”. He had no idea of the objective 
reasons that Mr. Latif was considered a threat to the national security of the United 
States. What is more, he never showed any interest in finding out those reasons.97
While the Tribunal did not make this claim, the image that emerges from 
their assessment of Gignac’s conduct is of someone who is too American, and 
insufficiently Canadian, in his approach towards security issues.
Moreover, the Tribunal remained unconvinced by Gignac’s concerns over 
the effect on Bombardier’s operations should they permit the re-training of 
Captain Latif. The Tribunal found that Bombardier had not established how or 
even whether its training centres would be affected if they trained Latif.98 Indeed, 
the Tribunal emphasized that Latif had been hired by Flight Safety International 
in Toronto to train pilots on their flight simulators under his Canadian licence.99 
In 2006, like Bombardier, Flight Safety International asked Latif to train under 
his American pilot licence and obtain a security clearance from the United 
States. He once again sought and was once again denied a clearance under his 
American licence by American officials. Unlike Bombardier, however, Flight 
Safety International continued to employ Latif and he continued to train 
pilots under his Canadian licence. American officials did not object to Flight 
Safety International’s decision to continue to employ Latif under his Canadian 
licence.100 They had no jurisdiction to do so. Flight Safety International faced 
no repercussions from American authorities for continuing to employ Captain 
Latif to train other pilots. Captain Latif testified that he also contacted Transport 
Canada, who did not object to his training under a Canadian licence.101 Despite 
these facts, Gignac simply assumed there would be “an incredible impact” 
on Bombardier if it trained Latif under his Canadian licence.102 In the process, 
possessing an “absolute security” approach, Gignac ignored the impact that his 
decision-making would have on Latif.
After analyzing Gignac’s decision-making, the Tribunal defined the remedy 
and explained the relationship between the remedy ordered and his conduct. The 
Supreme Court of Canada, however, did not reference Gignac’s testimony or the 
Tribunal’s findings regarding Gignac. Nor did it consider Gignac’s comments 
and conduct as evidence of discrimination. Gignac clearly indicated that there 
97. Ibid at para 335.
98. Ibid at para 357.
99. Ibid at paras 113-18.
100. Ibid at para 356.
101. Ibid at para 91.
102. Ibid at para 143.
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was no doubt in his mind that Captain Latif was a potential terrorist; one is 
hard pressed to think of a statement that more clearly conveys a stereotypical 
notion of another.
Both the Commission and Latif pointed the Court to the problematic 
aspects of Gignac’s conduct in their arguments before the Court. For example, the 
Commission’s written submissions highlighted the prejudicial effect of Gignac’s 
labelling Latif as a potential terrorist:
The label “potential terrorist” affixed to Mr. Latif by Mr. Gignac without any solid 
reason and without consulting Canadian authorities illustrates the “detrimental and 
corrosive” effect of prejudice and underscores the dangers of adopting the prima 
facie test set out by the Court of Appeal …
“At a time when stereotypes have intensified towards Arabs, Muslims and individuals 
from Muslim countries because of 9/11, it is equally crucial that standards aimed 
at controlling the use of stereotypes in the decision-making process be properly 
addressed.”103
Captain Latif ’s written submissions to the Court also stressed that Bombardier 
had acted rashly without properly considering the nature or consequences of its 
treatment of him:
Although Bombardier was not required either by statute or by contract to heed 
the results of [the American] … security screening when evaluating a request for 
training under a Canadian pilot’s licence, it did so without further investigation, 
thereby seriously curtailing Mr. Latif ’s ability to work as a pilot for more than four 
years.104
Similarly, the joint submissions of the National Council of Canadian 
Muslims and the Canadian Muslim Association directly linked unconscious bias 
and stereotyping of Muslims in Canadian society with Gignac’s decision-making:
In his testimony before the tribunal in the instant case, the Bombardier employee, 
Mr. Gignac, described his decision with respect to the appellant’s application as 
“nothing against him personally.” The witness then segued to the story of an operator 
he knew personally who worked at the training school of one of the 9/11 attackers: 
“… [the attackers] learned how to take off, not even to land, and they flew into the 
tower. It was shocking. That couldn’t happen. It was inconceivable. Those things just 
can’t happen. But they did.” Such testimony illustrates the unconscious cognitive 
associations that can and often do lead to discriminatory decision-making.105
103. Commission Factum, supra note 44 at para 97 [author’s translation].
104. Javed Latif Factum, supra note 80 at para 6.
105. NCCM & CMLA Factum, supra note 45 at para 20.
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However, Gignac’s behaviour was almost irrelevant to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. Though much of the Tribunal’s 120-page decision focused significantly 
on Gignac’s decision-making, the Court mentioned him only three times in 
its reasons. Referencing Gignac three times at paragraph fourteen, the Court 
proceeds as though his primary role was to simply convey information to Latif 
about the availability of training.106 The Court later referenced Gignac to simply 
describe the Tribunal’s remedy.107 Gignac’s comments and conduct in relation to 
Latif, his failure to inquire with Canadian officials, and his remarkable decision 
to unilaterally apply American laws in a Canadian space were relegated to the 
realm of the unsaid in the Court’s reasons.
Gignac’s departure from the Court’s narrative of events contrasts with other 
Supreme Court of Canada decisions involving duties to investigate. In Young 
v Bella, for example, the Court found that the defendant Memorial University 
had acted negligently by failing to conduct its own inquiry into its suspicions 
that a student, Wanda Young, was a child sex offender.108 Young had handed 
in an un-sourced first person biographical statement for grading in a course. 
The instructor understood the statement as Young’s confession to the crime. 
Memorial University subsequently asked the RCMP to investigate. The Court 
held the University liable in tort law for reaching hasty conclusions about Young 
that would have disastrous consequences for her future. The Court also faulted 
the University for abdicating its responsibility to conduct its own inquiries, given 
its concerns about Young.109
In that vein, the Tribunal had faulted Bombardier for failing to inquire with 
Canadian officials about Latif for essentially the same troubling reasons evident 
in Wanda Young’s case: Bombardier had abdicated its responsibility to Latif and 
had set off a chain of events that affected his future, reputation, and earning 
capacity. But, unlike the staff of Memorial University, Gignac was spared scrutiny 
by the Court, which held that his conduct was not relevant to determining prima 
facie discrimination:
Finally, the Commission faults Bombardier for failing to check with the Canadian 
authorities or to ask the U.S. authorities to explain the reasons for their refusal. In 
this regard, it should be noted that Mr. Latif himself did not receive any explanation. 
In any event, even if these allegations might be of some relevance at the second step 
of the analysis (that of justification), it is our opinion that they do not show a 
106. Bombardier, supra note 8 at para 14.
107. Ibid at para 25.
108. Young v Bella, 2006 SCC 3, [2006] 1 SCR 108 [Young].
109. Ibid at para 34.
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connection between the prohibited ground and the exclusion of Mr. Latif, and that 
they are of no assistance.110
This part of the Court’s analysis proves particularly puzzling for several 
reasons. First, the Tribunal placed significant weight on Bombardier’s failure to 
inquire with Canadian authorities. The Tribunal found that Gignac failed to check 
with Canadian officials about Captain Latif precisely because Gignac had already 
concluded that Latif was a potential terrorist. Having drawn the conclusion that 
Latif represented a heightened risk to national security based on his identity, 
Gignac felt no need to check with Canadian officials. The Court, however, did 
not see the link between, on the one hand, Gignac’s failure to investigate properly 
and, on the other, the stereotypes that he espoused about Latif. Discrimination, 
the Court affirmed, involves two stages. First, the complainant bears the 
burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination. To meet this burden, 
complainants must demonstrate that “that they have a characteristic protected 
from discrimination … that they experienced an adverse impact with respect 
to the service; and that the protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse 
impact.”111 The respondent then bears the burden of justifying its conduct. 
The Tribunal had found that Bombardier’s failure to act justified a finding of 
discrimination. Adopting language more appropriate to a de novo hearing than 
judicial review, the Court dismissed the significance of Bombardier’s failure 
to act on the basis that “it is our opinion that they do not show a connection 
between the prohibited ground and the exclusion of Mr. Latif.”112 The Court 
thus ushered Gignac’s failure to investigate out of the first stage of analysis, 
rendering it irrelevant to Captain Latif ’s prima facie case and ultimately deeming 
Bombardier’s failure to inquire “of no assistance” to Latif.113
Equally surprisingly, the Court characterized the fact that Bombardier had 
failed to check with Canadian authorities as an “allegation” when the Tribunal 
had found that Bombardier had failed to inquire. Indeed, the failure to inquire 
was noted in the Tribunal’s decision under the title “The Facts as Adduced” 
and the Tribunal emphasized the failure in its decision, specifically noting that 
Gignac had made clear under cross-examination that he had not inquired about 
Latif with Canadian authorities:
110. Bombardier, supra note 8 at para 97.
111. Ibid at para 63 citing Moore v British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para 33, 
[2012] 3 SCR 360.
112. Bombardier, supra note 8 at para 97.
113. Ibid.
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Cross-examined by the Commission about whether he had contacted the Canadian 
authorities in order to check whether Bombardier could train Mr. Latif under a 
Canadian licence, Mr. Gignac said he had not.114
In its decision, the Tribunal cited Gignac’s testimony at length. It is worth 
reproducing that testimony to make abundantly clear the basis on which the 
Tribunal reached its finding about Gignac’s failure to inquire.
Mr. Gignac added that he never sought information or advice from Transport 
Canada in dealing with the matter, or of the Canadian security authorities, except 
[TRANSLATION] “perhaps” when [TRANSLATION] “chatting confidentially” 
with the RCMP in his office. Mr. Gignac’s testimony regarding that fact should be 
cited here:
[TRANSLATION]
Q. At that point, did you contact a Canadian authority to inform it of the 
conclusions of the Americans?
A. No, I didn’t talk about it. Let me think. Let me cast my mind back. No, that did 
not concern Transport Canada inspectors.
Q. Did you contact the Canadian Security Intelligence Service?
A. No. I contacted CSIS several times outside of … Mr. Latif ’s case. What is CSIS 
in French; it’s the Security Intelligence Service and the RCMP for cases and, yes, we 
communicated.
Q. But we’re talking about Mr. Latif ’s case.
A. Mr. Latif, I didn’t talk at all about Mr. Latif with CSIS.
Q. Transport Canada?
A. Transport Canada, no.
Q. The RCMP?
A. Maybe the RCMP. I say maybe because I … we had another case and Mr. Latif ’s 
name may have come up, but it was while chatting in my office, confidentially.
Q. And you …
A. I didn’t hear anything.
Q. First you said you contacted no one?
A. Because I don’t want to say no, I never said anything, because, with the RCMP, we 
talked about other cases and, sometimes, they asked me whether I had cases involving 
confidential information, and they …, I said … I may have said something because it 
114. Bombardier QCTDP, supra note 13 at para 159.
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was during the same period that Mr. Latif, that I told the RCMP that we had a case and 
I don’t even know whether I mentioned the name. I said we had a case in which training 
was denied and he said “Really,” he in fact said that did not concern them for the time 
being, and we talked about other things …
Q. First you said you did not contact any Canadian authority …
A. Yes, I know, but I did not contact any officially about … at no …
Q. To make your decision?
A. No. To make my decision, so I maintain that position.
Q. So no authority then …
A. No authority.f
Q. … including the Canadian Department of Defence, too, I guess?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. Is that it?
A. Yes.115
It is not clear how or why the Court reduced the Tribunal’s clear and 
important finding of fact about Gignac’s failure to meaningfully inquire about 
Latif with Canadian officials to a less significant “allegation.”
Captain Latif remained out of the public eye when the story of Bombardier’s 
victory at the Supreme Court of Canada broke. While finding against Captain 
Latif, the Court nonetheless affirmed that the law will guard against implicit biases; 
complainants need only establish a prima facie case, and foreign companies cannot 
ignore Canadian human rights law. The Commission scored a partial victory, and 
the judges and lawyers moved on to the next contest. But, the significance of the 
Tribunal and the Court’s narrative struggle in Bombardier surpasses the interests 
of the parties and the development of precedent. Bombardier represents a lost 
opportunity to counter the narrative that Muslims as a group present a threat to 
Canada and suggests the need for better understanding of Islamophobia on the 
part of Canada’s legal system.
In assessing the suffering imposed by Memorial University on Young, a white 
woman, the Court found that Young was entitled to compensation. A jury 
had awarded Young damages because of Memorial University’s “termination 
of her hope of becoming a social worker” and the Court refused to interfere 
115. Ibid at para 160 [emphasis in original].
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with the jury’s decision.116 In their fascinating article “Law in the Cultivation of 
Hope,” Karen Abrams and Hila Keren reflect on the power of law to encourage 
or discourage hope in individuals, particularly those on the social or political 
margins.117 They argue that paying more attention to the law’s capacity to inspire 
hope might give us a better sense of how social change can be pursued through 
the law. In this view, hope is not simply an emotion; it is both site and symbol 
of the relationship between litigants, the legal system, and society’s goals. The 
law’s ability to cultivate hope, moreover, is not limited to the individual; the law 
engenders hope or hopelessness for individuals who share a particular predicament 
with a litigant, or who imagine that the predicament is sharable in the sense that 
it can be visited upon them or someone they know specifically because they share 
social markers with a litigant. The willingness or ability of the legal system to care 
about and cultivate hope thus says as much about the system’s attentiveness to 
communities as it does about the subjective desires of the litigants.
What hope did Captain Latif have when he first learned that he had been 
listed as a potential terrorist by American authorities without explanation or 
recourse? How much more hope did he lose when he saw employment contract 
after employment contract vanish? What did hope feel like to him when he had 
to borrow money from his son to pay his mortgage? What happened to his hope 
when the Court of Appeal of Quebec overturned the Tribunal’s decision? Did he 
envision the possibility of a secure economic future after the Supreme Court of 
Canada dashed what little hope that he might have had left over a decade into his 
battle with Quebec’s economic and cultural giant, Bombardier Aerospace? What 
happened to hope when the Court ordered costs against the Commission and 
Captain Latif “on a solidary basis, in this Court.”118 Does Captain Latif retain 
any hope that Canada’s legal system can produce a just outcome? Surely Captain 
Latif felt a “loss of hope” after being falsely labelled and losing his reputation and 
livelihood in the same way that Young must have experienced it.
Suzanne McMurphy observes that trust is “a human phenomenon that plays 
a critical role in our personal lives … in the fabric of society … in the stability 
of financial markets … and the strength of governments.”119 McMurphy urges 
116. Young, supra note 108 at para 22.
117. Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, “Law in the Cultivation of Hope” (2007) 
95:2 Cal L Rev 319.
118. Bombardier, supra note 8 at para 107.
119. Suzanne McMurphy, “Trust, Distrust and Trustworthiness in Argumentation: Virtues 
and Fallacies” (delivered at the Tenth International Conference of the Ontario Society for 
the Study of Argumentation, 22-26 May, 2013) at 1, online: <scholar.uwindsor.ca/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=2083&context=ossaarchive>.
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institutions to move away from questions like “how do I gain the trust of a client, 
of a constituent, of a voter or a consumer” and argues for a focus on how institutions 
can cultivate their own trustworthiness.120 McMurphy’s work has important 
implications for access to justice. Although we do not yet have a framework for 
thinking about trust and trustworthiness as an aspect of access to justice, we can 
begin to reflect on their importance by acknowledging that individuals decide 
whether to engage in naming, blaming, and claiming121 partly by considering 
the extent to which public institutions understand their lived experiences.122 
Understanding lived experience comprises a component of trustworthiness for 
the simple reason that institutions cannot judge without understanding.
Ultimately, the story of Captain Latif ’s quest for justice reveals as much 
about Canadian law and legal institutions as it does about American law and 
legal institutions. In the process of denying a remedy to Latif, the Court re-wrote 
his narrative by moving attention away from key facts involving his interactions 
with Bombardier. The Court’s chosen narrative also regulated the collective fears 
and aspirations of Muslim communities in Canada to the realm of the unsaid. 
It further denied, through silence, the nature and impact of national security 
profiling as community experience. In the context of this case, the plea for 
attention to narratives amounts to little more than a plea for the Court to name 
and render visible a stereotype that attached itself to Latif and that has plagued 
the Muslim community in Canada at least since 9/11.
III. CONCLUSION
Gignac unwittingly pointed to the divergent narratives that would be told by 
Quebec Human Rights Tribunal and the Supreme Court of Canada when he 
testified to the sensations he experiences flying over the un-bordered geography 
of Canada and the United States:
120. Ibid at 7.
121. See William LF Felstiner, Richard L Abel & Austin Sarat, “The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming…” (1981) 15:3 Law 
& Soc’y Rev 631.
122. Women, for example, did not pursue sexual harassment litigation at a time when society 
tended to regard sexualized conduct in the workplace as “flirting.” See e.g. Constance 
Backhouse, “Sexual Harassment: A Feminist Phrase that Transformed the Workplace” (2012) 
24:2 CJWL 275; Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 151.
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When I take off with my plane, I’m free. It’s phenomenal. I take off over Montréal. 
I see Albany, New York … I can see that it’s … me … I’m passionate about aviation. 
There are no borders.123
Gignac offered this image of North American geography as justification 
for his refusal to permit Captain Latif training in either Texas or Quebec, and 
to explain his enthusiasm for American national security decision-making. But 
his description of flying over a borderless Canada–United States held more 
significance than he likely imagined. The Quebec Human Rights Tribunal 
responded to Gignac’s geographic erasure by re-asserting the legal boundaries 
between Canada and the United States, disapproving of Gignac’s preference for 
American norms over Canadian ones, and finding in favour of the Commission 
and Captain Latif. It heard Latif ’s story against the backdrop of profiling and 
other stereotyping practices in both the United States and Canada, and it rejected 
the possibility that Canada should condone profiling and stereotyping as they had 
been condoned in the United States. The Supreme Court of Canada, for its part, 
after erasing Gignac, cast its vision beyond the border, focusing solely on the United 
States while declining to cast judgment on the part of Captain Latif ’s story that 
took place in Canada and most directly implicated Bombardier Aerospace. The 
Court sheltered Gignac from scrutiny and, in its reasons, silenced the Tribunal’s 
analysis of Bombardier’s conduct in Canada. The Court’s silence denied, once 
again, the collective experiences of Muslims who have faced heightened profiling, 
stereotyping, and other forms of discrimination in Canada since 9/11.
Perhaps these collective experiences, metonymized by Latif ’s case, will 
eventually become impervious to denial as advocates continue to insist on 
counter narratives and continue to seek equal access to justice for Muslims and 
other equality-seeking groups. We might then revisit the decision-making in 
Bombardier and read it as a story of law’s troubled relationship with Arab and 
Muslim communities as much as the individual tale of Captain Javed Latif ’s 
quest for compensation for his treatment at the hands of Bombardier Aerospace.
123. Bombardier QCTDP, supra note 13 at para 142.
